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COMPARISONS are already being drawn in Washington between the appointment of Mr William J. Casey as CIA director under the Reagan Administration and the choice of Mr John McCone for the same role under the Kennedy Administration.

Both men are shrewd non-professionals (although Mr Casey served with distinction in the Office of Strategic Services) and is remembered with affection by many wartime colleagues in London whose instinct may prove a surer guide to policy than the conventional wisdoms of the established bureaucracy. Mr McCone's instinct told him that Khrushchev had secreted missiles in Cuba when CIA analysts were still unconvinced. Similarly, Mr Casey is unlikely to pay overmuch respect to estimates from the analytical side of the CIA — the National Foreign Assessments Centre (NFAC) — suggesting that the motivation for the Soviet military build-up is essentially defensive: his instinct tells him otherwise.

According to sources inside Mr Reagan's CIA transition team, a major overhaul of NFAC is expected to be one of the first consequences of Mr Casey's appointment. The present head of NFAC, Mr Bruce Clark, is expected to be replaced.

One leading contender to take his place is Mr George Carver, a former CIA station chief in Bonn, now based at the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, who serves on Mr Reagan's transition team and has made himself a subtle and engaging commentator on intelligence matters.

In a parallel development, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the other components of Pentagon Intelligence are likely to be given a larger role in the shaping of national estimates; their predictive record is generally recognised to have been much better than that of NFAC. Mr Casey and his team are likely to move slowly, avoiding radical staffing changes at Langley; the view in the Reagan camp is that the CIA has already been dangerously demoralised through purges of veteran officers.

THE INTELLIGENCE WAR PUTTING MUSIC IN THE CIA BY ROBERT MOSS

However, the new CIA director is likely to want to re-engage the services of some of the senior people who were fired, or pressured into premature retirement, under Admiral Stansfield Turner or his no-less controversial predecessor, Mr William Colby. In addition to "analysis," the other component of CIA activities that is likely to be subjected to most rigorous scrutiny is counter-intelligence.

There is widespread concern that the counter-intelligence (CI) staff was fatally weakened in 1974, when Mr Colby managed to engineer the ouster of Mr James Jesus Angleton, for two decades the agency's CI chief.

The nominal cause of Mr Angleton's removal was the Press leak of his involvement in a programme of domestic mail intercepts. It was not made clear at the time that this programme had been initiated as early as 1953 with full presidential authority, and that it has resulted in the discovery of an important East German "illegal" as well as of contacts between prominent Congressional figures and the Soviet KGB.

Staff cuts

With Mr Angleton's fall, the powers of the centralised CIA staff were radically reduced, and the security of the department's own files — including sensitive studies of allied secret services — was lessened, giving rise to concern that CIA operations and allied secrets had become more vulnerable to Soviet detection and penetration.

Counter-intelligence is rarely popular within a secret service, since the CIA role is to play the institutional devil's advocate, questioning, for example, whether a defector or a double agent (whose case-handlers may be intensely proud of their work) is the genuine, or a Beaufort-controlled plant.

The breakdown of relations, however, entire intelligence penetration and by its antagonism Mr Angleton is, who have been the Reagan team on the CI re-

the next admiral his advice is weighed very seriously, not least because of the close relationship of trust that Mr Angleton established in the past with many friendly secret services, including the Israeli

The whole question of CI organisation is taken up in a valuable collection of papers edited by Dr Roy Godson, that will be published early next year by the Washington-based Consortium for the Study of Intelligence as part of a series entitled "Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s."

Contributors to the new volume, entitled "Counter-intelligence," include senior present and former CIA and DIA officials.

Two of the most provocative papers in the book are by Mr Norman L. Smith and Mr Donovar Pratt, who were formerly (respectively) chief of operations and research director on the CIA's counter-intelligence staff.

Mr. Smith argues that it is necessary to re-establish a centralised CI staff with a wide purview, not only to ensure the security of the CIA's intelligence-collection and covert action operations, but to undertake its own offensive double-agent and deception activities against the KGB.

He argues the very special qualifications required to make a successful CI specialist — not only in terms of intellectual ability, but in terms of familiarity with hundreds of individual cases, over many years. He rightly observes that the Soviet intelligence services place the greatest emphasis on the kind of historical cases for which no computerised data bank can substitute.

the creation of a fully clandestine service, outside the present CIA structure, to conduct intelligence and CI operations.

The present CIA, largely reduced to analysis, covert action and paramilitary operations (none of which are likely to remain secret indefinitely, or perhaps even for very long) would remain to deflect interest and scandal away from the clandestine service.

This is one of the many current proposals for the restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community that will be reaching Mr Casey's desk.

Within the narrower area of CI itself, Mr. Casey will be urged by some members of the CIA transition team to re-initiate the review of Soviet deception operations — especially those involving double agents in New York who may have been controlled by the KGB — that was aborted by the 1974 purge.

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People

On the Record

William E. Colby, 59, former CIA director, repenting the agency's use of organized-crime figures in an early '60s Castro assassination plot: "You couldn't find a more inept crowd than the Mafia."



William E. Colby
Different defense posture cited

Ex-CIA chief questions need to match Soviet arms

Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Because it has different strategic needs than the Soviet Union, the United States need not seek point-for-point equivalence with the Soviet military, former CIA director William E. Colby said yesterday.

"We don't have to match them on everything," said Colby. "Forces and weaponry must be chosen (carefully), and the temptation avoided to mirror-image the Soviets."

Colby cited several areas where, he said, it would be foolish for the United States to attempt to match Soviet military deployment.

He said the U.S. Navy did not need a fleet of offensive submarines compa-

rable to the Soviets because "the American need is for effective anti-submarine warfare for our convoys to Europe and Japan."

And the United States does not need a nuclear first-strike capability because cruise missiles, the MX missile and other second-strike weapons would provide the necessary military deterrence, Colby said.

Speaking at a seminar on foreign policy issues sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, Colby suggested that U.S. strength in the decade would depend as heavily on the vitality of its economic base and the vigor of its political leadership as the preparedness of its armed services.

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Notes on People

Colby Defends C.I.A., but Also Concedes Its Flaws

Assuring his audience that he was "not a cloak-and-dagger man showing only the cloak and not the dagger," William E. Colby, the former Director of Central Intelligence, lifted the cloak a bit Monday night at a free-wheeling "dialogue meeting" of the Humanist Society of Metropolitan New York. According to an infiltrator at the meeting, in a not-so-secret upper room at Rosoff's restaurant, Mr. Colby was both candid and disarming as he defended the need for a secret intelligence agency. He fielded spirited challenges from such civil libertarians as Prof. Paul Lehmann of the Princeton Theological Seminary and Algernon D. Black, head of the Ethical Culture Society.

When Corliss Lamont, the philosopher, recalled that he had won both damages and an apology after suing

the C.I.A. for opening mail he had sent his wife from Moscow, Mr. Colby said that the practice had stopped and that he had been against it all along.

Conceding that "we did a lot of things wrong," Mr. Colby provided reassurance of sorts when he said the "stupidest" thing the C.I.A. had ever done was to enlist organized-crime figures in an effort to kill Cuba's President Fidel Castro. "You couldn't find a more inept crowd than the Mafia," he said.